
NPR recently published an op-ed on Afghanistan by Rachel Reid, an Afghanistan specialist with Human Rights Watch. (Related material on Afghan women’s rights can be found here.) She makes a compelling argument for the U.S. Af-Pak policy: end relations with corrupt warlords, prioritize women’s rights, and do not increase foreign troop levels unless their presence will actually contribute to Afghan’s security. Sounds clear and clean enough. But the Obama Administration, and its special Af-Pak policy team, led by the infamous Richard Holbrooke, will have a difficult time delivering such a policy.
In fighting the war in Afghanistan, the United States has been presented with two approaches:
1. The minimalist view calls for an abandonment of counter-insurgency in Afghanistan and a renewed focus on Al Qaeda. This view has been endorsed by a variety of thinkers, including Leslie Gelb, Vice President Joe Biden, and the Bush Administration, and is thus responsible for landing America in its current quagmire. Despite its obvious failings, this view correctly asserts that America is severely limited in its understanding of Afghanistan’s internal complexities, and is ill equipped to fight an elusive enemy in the mountains of Afghanistan. Furthermore, it would be delusional to think that America can build a viable Afghan state. Nation-building, which encompasses intoxicating ideas like civilian freedom, women’s rights, and education, were toted as justification for invading Iraq and a band-aid for the insurgency that erupted there. It is folly to think that these same civil-society-strengthening initiatives will result in a victory this time around.
2. Alternatively, policy makers recognize that neither Al Qaeda, nor Afghanistan, exist in a vacuum, and a pure counterterror approach will not produce sustainable results in the region. Al Qaeda is part of a terror syndicate, whose numbers and members are constantly growing and shifting. Afghanistan is also far from a unifed, stable nation-state with consistent control over the entirety of its territory and its borders. Any action in Afghanistan will directly affect terrorist networks and internal affairs in its neighbor, Pakistan, whose own stabillity and complex slate of issues are tied to the disputed area of Kashmir and relations with India. Therefore, the comprehensive view argues that America’s clear goal should be to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but that government reform and the bolstering of civil society are paramount to ensure a lasting stability.
The Obama administration has taken the latter route. In his remarks on America’s new Af-Pak strategy, the President stated:
A campaign against extremism will not succeed with bullets or bombs alone… to advance security, opportunity and justice — not just in Kabul, but from the bottom up in the provinces — we need agricultural specialists and educators, engineers and lawyers.
A bipartisan bill to deliver annual aid to Pakistan over the next five years, the Kerry-Lugar Pakistan Authorization Bill, was signed into law as S. 1707: Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 by the President last month. Throughout America’s time in the region, the President called for benchmarks to measure progress, a valuable step that the Bush Administration ignored, but also a lofty set of ambitions that will likely never been entirely completed to this or future administrations’ satisfaction. He has not and will not provide a timetable. In March 2008, Holbrooke predicted:
This war, already in its seventh year, will eventually become the longest in American history.
While increasing women’s political and social rights in Afghanistan is a tantalizing thought, it is just another part of the promised package that America cannot deliver. Refusing to engage in dialogue with corrupt leaders is not possible either, even though Obama wants to “seek a new compact with the Afghan government that cracks down on corrupt behavior.” Clean behavior is hard to find if Afghanistan, however. Whether Afghans had voted for Hamid Kharzai or Abdullah Abdullah, an Afghan who Reid interviewed said:
I did not vote. The warlords win whoever I vote for.
America has not much choice but to engage with warlords if it wants to achieve any structural change in governance and domestic Afghan policy.
Reid’s observation about security, however, is something to note. She writes:
Those who argue for more troops should first explain what those forces will do and how they will enhance, instead of diminish, security.
Increased number of troops is too frequently equated with an increased level of security, when often the opposite desired effect occurs. Increased security leads to an increased perception of insecurity that necessitates the such force, and breeds feelings among the local populace that they are being occupied and threatened and insurgency is the only available form of retaliation. General McKiernan in Afghanistan had been requesting an increase in troops for months, and now that his wish has been delivered, the Af-Pak team would be wise to keep them there for as short a time as possible.
For daily updates on the U.S. Af-Pak policy and current events in the region, subscribe to the Afghanistan listserv, administered by Barnett Rubin, the country’s leading expert of Afghanistan, Director of Studies at NYU’s Center on International Cooperation, and a staff member with Holbrooke’s Af-Pak team.
Filed under: South Asia, Af-Pak policy, Afghanistan, aid, Obama, Pakistan, women's rights